Shigenori Togo: Engaging in War Diplomacy
By Wang Xiliang
Shigenori Togo was born in Kuyshu in 1882. After graduating from the German Department at the Tokyo Imperial University in 1912, he worked in the Foreign Ministry, and held successive posts of alternate consul at the Consulate-General in Fengtian (the present-day Shenyang), counselor at the Embassy in Germany and first secretary at the Embassy in the US. He was appointed ambassador to Germany in 1937 and to the Soviet Union in 1938.
Dealing with the USSR
In May 1939 the Kwantung Army provoked a large-scale armed conflict with the Soviet Union troops in Nomonhan Village on the borderline between China and Mongolia. The Kwantung Army suffered heavy casualties and lost an entire division.
Togo was authorized to immediately conduct several rounds of negotiations with USSR Foreign Minister Vjatjeslav Molotov, and finally the two sides signed a truce agreement. At the postwar International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Togo cited this experience as "proof" that he was actually a "pacifist who dares to fight with the militarism."
In 1941 Togo became Foreign Minister and Minister of Overseas Affairs concurrently in Hideki Tojo"s cabinet. The fact that he gladly accepted pro-war Tojo"s nomination at least demonstrates that he was in favor of the aggression policy adopted by Tojo"s cabinet. However, some historical materials have revealed that before assuming office, Togo once said "If the army went on taking a strong attitude toward the issue of stationing troops in China, diplomatic talks would be hard to continue." After Tojo promised to "reconsider issues including Japanese-US relationship and stationing troops in China," he eventually agreed to take the post of Foreign Minister.
Dealing with the US
Togo attended the Emperor"s Council held on November 5, 1941 to discuss matters concerning the future war with the US. He put forward two proposals at the meeting to deal with the US.
According to the first, Japan should independently decide and interpret the tripartite pact on the Germany-Italy-Japan alliance, partially withdraw troops stationed in north China, the area bordering on Mongolia and Hainan Island within prescribed time (25 years), or completely withdraw troops within two years under the prerequisite of true peace between Japan and China.
According to the second, neither Japan nor the US could enter Southeast Asia and the South Pacific region by using force. Instead, they should cooperate to acquire resources from Indonesia and resume the Japanese-US trade treaty.
Obviously, the US side could accept neither of them. Their purpose was just to play for time. Togo instructed Kichisaburo Nomura, the then Japanese ambassador to Washington, to negotiate with the US on the basis of the two proposals, and set the deadline on November 25 for the negotiations.
On November 7, Nomura presented the first plan to US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, which was firmly rejected by the US side. Three days later, Togo summoned US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew, insisting that Japan would take no refusal. On November 12 he turned to ask the UK ambassador to Japan to mediate between the two parties. Although the mediation failed, it won time for Japan.
On November 20 Togo directed Nomura to present the second plan. On November 27 Hull tabled a memorandum, asking Japan to withdraw all its troops from China and Indo-China, and not to recognize any governments in China (referring to Wang Jingwei"s regime in Nanjing) other than the Chongqing one. Hull"s memorandum declared the failure of Togo"s diplomacy.
On November 28 and 29, Togo sent consecutive coded telegrams to Nomura, stating that Hull"s memorandum "disregarded the reality in East Asia, and greatly damaged Japan"s prestige." On November 30 he instructed Ambassador to Germany Hiroshi Oshima to inform Germany of the US" hostile attitude toward the tripartite alliance, to win its sympathy and support. The Emperor"s Council on December 1 finally decided to make war on the US, the UK and the Netherlands.
Sophistry in court
Some historical materials have stated that after the failure of Japanese-US negotiations, Togo was ready to hand in his resignation. Only after some officials said that he would be succeeded by a pro-war Foreign Minister did he change his mind. In fact, from 1941 to 1943 he had been active on the political and diplomatic arenas, assisting Tojo in starting the Pacific War. He indeed resigned in September 1943 for opposing Tojo"s decision to establish a "Ministry of Greater East Asia," but two years later he became Foreign Minister and Minister of Greater East Asia concurrently in Kantaro Suzuki"s cabinet.
He was arrested in April 1946 as a Class-A war criminal suspect. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1948 found him guilty of planning wars against China, the US, the UK and the Netherlands and sentenced him to 20 years" imprisonment.
At the tribunal, Togo defended himself that besides withdrawing troops from China and Indo-China, Hull"s memorandum also requested Japan to abrogate the tripartite alliance. Japan would have to act in bad faith to meet this demand, he argued. In addition, if Japan did withdraw troops, it would lose all its interests in north and south China, and its enterprises based in China would have to stop production. Losing credibility with Wang Jingwei"s Nanjing government as requested by the memorandum would arouse anti-Japanese feelings across China. If Japan withdrew from Manchuria, the political impact would spread to Korea. "Hull"s memorandum had forced Japan to choose between surrender and war. Accepting it would make Japan fall from a big power to a third-class country in East Asia. Therefore, all Cabinet members unanimously agreed that Japan had no alternative but to wage a war of self-defense," he said.
His arguments fully demonstrate that he had been speaking from the standpoint of the colonial rulers, not hesitate to use force to maintain Japan as a "great power." He died in prison on July 23, 1950.
