The reply is -- Philosophy may still properly be the title retained forknowledge of the highest generality. Science means merely the family of theSciences -- stands for nothing more than the sum of knowledge formed of theircontributions; and ignores the knowledge constituted by the fusion of thesecontributions into a whole. As usage has defined it, Science consists oftruths existing more or less separated, and does not recognize these truthsas entirely integrated. An illustration will make the difference clear.
If we ascribe the flow of a river to the same force which causes the fallof a stone, we make a statement that belongs to a certain division of Science.
If, to explain how gravitation produces this movement in a direction almosthorizontal, we cite the law that fluids subject to mechanical forces exertre-active forces which are equal in all directions, we formulate a widertruth, containing the scientific interpretations of many other phenomena;as those presented by the fountain, the hydraulic press, the steam-engine,the air-pump. And when this proposition, extending only to the dynamics offluids, is merged in a proposition of general dynamics, comprehending thelaws of movement of solids as well as of fluids, there is reached a yet highertruth; but still a truth that comes wholly within the realm of Science. Again,looking around at Birds and Mammals, suppose we say that air-breathing animalsare hot-blooded; and that then, remembering how Reptiles, which also breatheair, are not much warmer than their media, we say, more truly, that animals(bulks being equal) have temperatures proportionate to the quantities ofair they breathe; and that then, calling to mind certain large fish, as thetunny, which maintain a heat considerably above that of the water they swimin, we further correct the generalization by saying that the temperaturevaries as the rate of oxygenation of the blood; and that then, modifyingthe statement to meet other criticisms, we finally assert the relation tobe between the amount of heat and the amount of molecular change -- supposingwe do all this, we state scientific truths that are successively wider andmore complete, but truths which, to the last, remain purely scientific. Oncemore if, guided by mercantile experiences, we reach the conclusions thatprices rise when the demand exceeds the supply; that commodities flow fromplaces where they are abundant to places where they are scarce; that theindustries of different localities are determined in their kinds mainly bythe facilities which the localities afford for them; and if, studying thesegeneralizations of political economy, we trace them all to the truth thateach man seeks satisfaction for his desires in ways costing the smallestefforts -- such social phenomena being resultants of individual actions soguided; we are still dealing with the propositions of Science only.
How, then, is Philosophy constituted? It is constituted by carrying astage further the process indicated. So long as these truths are known onlyapart and regarded as independent, even the most general of them cannot withoutlaxity of speech be called philosophical. But when, having been severallyreduced to a mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and a lawof social action, they are contemplated together as corollaries of some ultimatetruth, then we rise to the kind of knowledge which constitutes Philosophyproper.
The truths of Philosophy thus bear the same relation to the highest scientifictruths, that each of these bears to lower scientific truths. As each widestgeneralization of Science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalizationsof its own division; so the generalizations of Philosophy comprehend andconsolidate the widest generalizations of Science. It is therefore a knowledgethe extreme opposite in kind to that which experience first accumulates.
It is the final product of that process which begins with a mere colligationof crude observations, goes on establishing propositions that are broaderand more separated from particular cases, and ends in universal propositions.
Or to bring the definition to its ******st and clearest form: -- Knowledgeof the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge; Science is partially-unifiedknowledge; Philosophy is completely-unified knowledge. §38. Such, at least, is the meaning we must here give to the wordPhilosophy, if we employ it at all. In so defining it, we accept that whichis common to the various conceptions of it current among both ancients andmoderns -- rejecting those elements in which these conceptions disagree.
In short, we are simply giving precision to that application of the wordwhich has been gradually establishing itself.
Two forms of Philosophy as thus understood, may be distinguished and dealtwith separately. On the one hand, the things contemplated may be the universaltruths: all particular truths referred to being used simply for proof orelucidation of these universal truths. On the other hand, setting out withthe universal truths, the things contemplated may be the particular truthsas interpreted by them. In both cases we deal with the universal truths;but in the one case they are passive and in the other case active -- in theone case they form the products of exploration and in the other case theinstruments of exploration. These divisions we may appropriately call GeneralPhilosophy and Special Philosophy respectively.
The remainder of this volume will he devoted to General Philosophy. SpecialPhilosophy, divided into parts determined by the natures of the phenomenatreated, will be the subject-matter of subsequent volumes.
